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Mechner, 1958; Capaldi and Miller, 1988). It could be conjectured 
that pigeons and rats can count, at least up to a certain quantity; 
that is, they can recognize how many times a motor act – to peck 
on a board or to press a lever – has been repeated. Whether or not 
this behavior can really be interpreted as counting is nonetheless 
questionable. However, this behavior is observed, at least after a 
long and painstaking training. Nonetheless, these animal responses 
(to peck or to press the lever) are not precise but just approximate. 
In other words, when the rat is required to press the lever seven 
times, the rat presses it about seven times (i.e., 5, 6, 7, 8 times). 
As Dehaene (1997) emphasizes, for an animal, 5 plus 5 does not 
make 10, but only about 10. According to him, such fuzziness in 
the internal representation of numbers prevents the emergence of 
exact numerical arithmetical knowledge in animals. Using highly 
controlled and sophisticated designs, it has been pointed out that 
chimpanzees can even use and add simple numerical fractions (e.g., 
1/2 + 1/4 = 3/4) (Woodruff and Premack, 1981). These observa-
tions support the assumption that some quantity concepts can be 
found in different animals.
Counting (or rather, approximately counting) motor responses 
is just a motor act as is walking or running. “Counting” lever press-
ings is not very different from estimating the effort (e.g., number 
of steps or general motor activity) required in going from one 
point to another. Counting in such a case could be linked to some 
proprioceptive and kinesthetic information.
In the human brain Kansaku et al. (2006) identified a network 
of areas involved in enumerating small numbers of auditory, visual, 
and somatosensory stimuli, and in enumerating sequential move-
ments of hands and feet, in the bilateral premotor cortex, presup-
plementary motor area, posterior temporal cortex, and thalamus. 
The most significant consistent activation across sensory and 
IntroductIon
Calculation abilities have followed a long process from the initial 
quantification systems up to modern algebra, geometry, and phys-
ics. Some rudimentary numerical concepts are observed in animals, 
and there is no question that pre-historic man used some quanti-
fication. However, the ability to represent quantities, the develop-
ment of a numerical system, and the use of arithmetical operations 
are found only in old civilizations.
This paper reviews the evolution of calculation abilities, includ-
ing numerosity and counting in non-human animals, calculation 
abilities in primitive and modern humans, and links between lan-
guage and number concepts throughout human history. In addi-
tion, the paper reviews contemporary studies of the neurological 
substrates of numerical abilities and discusses the implications 
of technological advances with regard to continued evolution of 
these abilities.
numerIcal concepts In anImals
The origin of mathematical concepts can be traced to sub-human 
species. Throughout recent history different reports have argued 
that animals (horses, rats, dogs, chimpanzees, dolphins, and even 
birds) can use numerical concepts and perform arithmetical opera-
tions. Some of these reports represent evident charlatanry directed 
to the general public. Some others, however, are rigorous and highly 
controlled scientific studies (e.g., Rugani et al., 2009).
There is, in general, agreement that some rudimentary numeri-
cal concepts are observed in animals. These basic numerical skills 
can be considered as the real origin of the calculation abilities found 
in contemporary man. For instance, pigeons can be trained to peck a 
specific number of times on a board, and rats can be trained to press 
a lever a certain amount of times to obtain food (Koehler, 1951; 
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motor counting conditions was observed in the lateral premotor 
cortex. Lateral premotor activation was not dependent on move-
ment preparation, stimulus presentation timing, or number word 
verbalization. Furthermore, movement counting, but not sensory 
counting, activated the anterior parietal cortex.
Not only chimpanzees, but also rats and many other animals, can 
distinguish numerosity (i.e., global quantification); for instance, 
they prefer a bowl containing a larger number of nutritive elements 
(such as chocolates or pellets) when selecting between two bowls 
containing different amounts (Davis and Perusse, 1988). It may be 
conjectured that global quantification (numerosity perception) and 
counting (at least the approximate counting of motor responses) 
represent kinds of basic calculation abilities found at the animal 
level. Rats prefer a bowl containing 20 pellets to a bowl containing 
only 10 pellets; however, they do not prefer a bowl containing 20 
pellets to a bowl containing 21 pellets. Obviously, numerosity per-
ception is related to the size and shape of the visual image projected 
to the retina. It can be assumed that 20 pellets in a bowl result in 
a larger and more complex retinal image than 10 pellets. But the 
visual image corresponding to 20 pellets is difficult to distinguish 
from the visual image corresponding to 21 pellets.
calculatIon abIlItIes In pre-hIstorIc man
Chimpanzees are capable of various forms of numerical compe-
tence, including some correspondence constructions (that is, com-
paring two collections of elements) for low quantities (Premack, 
1976; Davis and Perusse, 1988). Most likely, these numerical abilities 
also existed in pre-historic man. Homo sapiens antecessors may 
have been capable of using correspondence constructions in some 
social activities, such as food sharing. It has been proposed that 
Homo habilis (ancestor of Homo erectus, living about 2.3 million 
to 1.4 million years ago) needed to use correspondence construc-
tions when butchering large animal carcasses (Parker and Gibson, 
1979). Distributing pieces of a divided whole (e.g., prey) into equal 
parts required the ability to construct one-to-one correspondences. 
Probably, Paleolithic man was able to match the number of objects 
in different groups and, eventually, the number of objects in a col-
lection with the number of items in some external cue system, e.g., 
fingers or pebbles (incidentally, calculus means pebbles).
The immediate recognition of certain small quantities is found 
not only in animals, but also in small children. Animals and children 
can readily distinguish one, two, or three objects (Fuson, 1988; 
Wynn, 1990, 1992; Cook and Cook, 2009). Antell and Keating 
(1983) observed that newborn infants were able to discriminate 
among visual stimulus arrays consisting of few a dots. It was found 
that infants were able to discriminate between small numbers (2 
versus 3) but not for larger sets. This ability for discriminating and 
also representing and remembering small numbers of items has also 
been reported by other authors (e.g., Starkey and Cooper, 1980). 
Interestingly, evoked potentials at 3 months are already capable 
of marking changes in the nature and number of a set of objects, 
and these activation changes relate to the parietal lobe (Dehaene 
and Dehaene-Lambertz, 2009). Noteworthy, in normally develop-
ing children and adults, the increase in arithmetic competence is 
associated with shift of activation from frontal brain areas to pari-
etal areas. A shift of activation is also observed within the parietal 
lobe from the intraparietal sulci to the left angular gyrus; experts’ 
arithmetic proficiency depends on a more extended activation than 
the network found in beginners. In expert individuals with solid, 
extensive mathematical training, specific brain activation changes 
are also observed (Zamarian et al., 2009).
Oneness, twoness, and threeness seemingly are basic perceptual 
qualities that our brain can distinguish and process without count-
ing. It can be conjectured that when pre-historic humans began to 
speak, they may have been able to name only the numbers one, two, 
and three, corresponding to specific perceptions. To name them was 
probably no more difficult than naming any other sensory attribute 
(Dehaene, 1997). Of note, all world languages can count up to three, 
even though three may represent “many”, “several”, or “a lot” (Hurford, 
1987). “One” is obviously the unit, the individual (the speaker may also 
be “one”). “Two” conveys the meaning of “another” (for example, in 
English and also in Spanish, “second” is related with the verb “to sec-
ond” and the adjective “secondary”). “Three” may be a residual form of 
“a lot”, “beyond the others”, or “many” (for example, “troppo”, which in 
Italian means “too much”, is seemingly related with the word three 
-tre). In the original Indo-European language, spoken perhaps some 
15000–20000 years ago, apparently the only numbers were “one”, “one 
and another” (two), and “a lot”, “several”, or “many” (three) (Dehaene, 
1997). Interestingly, in some contemporary languages, two different 
plurals are found: a plural for small quantities (usually two, sometimes 
three and four) and a second plural for larger quantities; for instance, 
in Russian, “one house” is “odin dom”, “two, three, or four houses” is 
“dva, tri, cheterye doma” but “five houses” is “pyat domov”.
Of note, in different world languages, the word “one” does not 
have any apparent relationship with the word “first”; and the word 
“two” is also not related with the word “second”. “Three” may some-
times, but not always, hold some relationship with “third”. Beyond 
three, ordinals are clearly associated with cardinal numbers. The con-
clusion is obvious: for small quantities (one, two, three), cardinals and 
ordinals must have a different origin. For larger quantities, ordinal 
numbers are derived from cardinals. As a matter of fact, one/first and 
two/second correspond to different conceptual categories.
It may be speculated that for pre-historic man the first per-
son and the second person in a line (or the first animal and the 
second animal during hunting, or other similar concepts) do 
not seem to be related with the number one and the number 
two. For small children “first” has the meaning of “initial” (e.g., 
“I go first”) whereas “second” is related to “later” or “after” (e.g., 
“you go second”). These words have a temporal and also spatial 
meaning, but not an evident numerical meaning. The associa-
tion between “one” and “first”, and “two” and “second” seems 
a relatively advanced process in the development of numerical 
concepts. That is, the numerical meaning of “first” and “second” 
seems to appear after its temporal and spatial meaning. The 
association between ordinals and cardinals becomes evident only 
for larger quantities (more than three) and seems to represent a 
later acquisition in human evolution and the complexization of 
numerical concepts. Moreover, in many contemporary languages 
(e.g., the Huitoto language, spoken by the Huitoto Indians in the 
Amazonian jungle1) there are no ordinal numbers. For “first”, 
the Huitoto language uses “the beginning”; to express “second” 
the word “another” is used.
1http://indian-cultures.com/Cultures/huitoto.html
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16: aniha-kae-behe kae-taxu-behe kaetaxuwusito (two hands, one 
foot, and one toe)
20: aniha-kabe-behe aniha-taxu-behe (two hands and two feet)
Fingers are named according to their order in counting (as men-
tioned above, counting begins always with the little finger of the left 
hand). The Sikuani language possesses number words only up to 
three (kae, aniha-behe, akueyabi). Four (penayanatsi = accompa-
nied, together) represents a correspondence construction. Strictly 
speaking, the Sikuani language counts only up to three. From four to 
twenty, they use a correspondence construction, not really counting; 
and for higher quantities, they resort to a global quantification.
Sometimes not only the fingers (and toes) but also other body 
segments may be used in counting: the wrist, the shoulders, the knees, 
etc. (Levy-Bruhl, 1910/1947; Cauty, 1984; Dansilio, 2008). However, 
sequencing the fingers (and toes) represents the most universal pro-
cedure in counting. Some languages (e.g., some Mayan dialects and 
Greenland Eskimo) use the same word to denote the number 20 
(that is, “all the fingers and all the toes”) and “a person”.
In different Amerindian languages, for higher than 10 or 20 
figures, most often “many” is used (global quantification princi-
ple) (Cauty, 1984; Ifrah, 2000). Or, they can refer to other people’s 
hands (correspondence construction) (e.g., thirty-five might be 
something like “my two hands, my two feet, my father’s two hands, 
my father’s one foot”). As mentioned, “twenty” sometimes becomes 
something like “one person”, a sort of higher order numeral. It 
is interesting to note that in some contemporary languages (like 
English and Spanish) “one” means the unit, but it is also used as 
a sort of indefinite personal pronoun. In English and Spanish we 
can also use “one” as synonymous with “myself”. Twenty is found 
to be the base number in the Mayan numerical system (Swadesh, 
1967; Cauty, 1984). In many contemporary languages, a 10 and/
or 20 base is evident.
“Digit” (from Latin digitus) means both number and finger. 
The correspondence construction between numbers and fingers is 
evident. Latin number notation was originally Etruscan (Turner, 
1984) and referred (as in other languages) to the fingers. One, two, 
and three were written simply by making vertical strokes. In four, 
the Latin system resorts to a simplification. Originally, four was 
written IIII, but later on it became IV. Five (V) represented the 
whole hand with the arm bent (that is, all the fingers of the hand), 
and ten (X) the two arms crossed.
From a neuropsychological perspective, a strong relation-
ship between numerical knowledge, finger gnosis, and even lat-
eral (right–left) knowledge is evident (Ardila and Rosselli, 2002; 
Kaufmann, 2008). Finger agnosia (and probably right–left discrimi-
nation disturbances) could be interpreted as a restricted form of 
autotopagnosia (inability to recognize or localize the various body 
parts) (Ardila et al., 1989, 2000).
It is not surprising to find that a decimal (or vigesimal, i.e., with 
a base of 20) system has been most often developed. Simultaneously 
or very close in time, decimal systems appeared in different coun-
tries (Sumer, Egypt, India, and Crete). Different symbols were used 
to represent 1, 10, 100, and 1000 (Childe, 1936; Dansilio, 2008).
There is, however, an interesting and intriguing exception: 
Sumerian and later Babylonians (about 2,000 BC) developed not 
only a decimal but also a sexagesimal system: a symbol represented 
Arithmetical abilities are clearly related with counting. 
Counting – not simply recording the approximate amount of 
motor responses required for obtaining reinforcement, but actu-
ally saying aloud a series of number words that correspond to 
a collection of objects – is relatively recent in human history. 
Counting also occurs relatively late in child development. In 
human history, as well as in child development, counting using 
number words begins with sequencing the fingers (i.e., using a 
correspondence construction) (Hitch et al., 1987). The name of 
the finger and the corresponding number can be represented using 
the very same word (that means the very same word is used for 
naming the thumb and the number one; the very same word is 
used to name the index finger and the number two, etc.). The fin-
gers [and toes; as a matter of fact, many languages such as Spanish 
use a single word (dedo) to name both the fingers and toes] are 
usually sequenced in a particular order. This strategy represents a 
basic procedure found in different ancient and contemporary cul-
tures around the world (LevyBruhl, 1910/1947; Cauty, 1984; Klein 
and Starkey, 1987; Dansilio, 2008). Interestingly, it has been dem-
onstrated that children with low arithmetical skills also present 
a finger misrepresentation on the Draw-a-Person test (Pontius, 
1989). This observation has been confirmed in different cultural 
groups. By the same token, difficulty in recognizing and nam-
ing the fingers represents a reliable predictor of developmental 
dyscalculia (Kaufmann, 2008).
Taking a typical example as an illustration, the Colombian 
Sikuani or Guahibo Amazonian jungle Indians2 count in the fol-
lowing way: the person (an adult when counting or a child when 
learning to count) places his/her left hand in supination; to point 
to number one, the right index points to the left little finger, which 
is then bent (Queixalos, 1989). The order followed in counting is 
always from the little finger to the index. To point to number five, 
the hand is turned and the fingers opened; for six, both thumbs 
are joined, the left fingers are closed, and the right opened; they are 
opened one after the other for seven, eight, nine and ten. Between 11 
and 20, the head points to the feet and the sequence is re-initiated. 
The lexicon used is:
 1: kae (the unit, one)
 2: aniha-behe (a pair, both)
 3: akueyabi
 4: penayanatsi (accompanied; that is, the fingers together)
 5: kae-kabe (one hand)
  Numbers from six to nine, are formed with “one hand and (a 
certain number) of fingers”. Ten becomes “two hands”:
 6: kae-kabe kae-kabesito-nua (one hand and one finger)
 7: kae-kabe anih-akabesito-behe (one hand and a pair of fingers)
10: anih-akabe-behe (two hands)
 “Two hands” is maintained between 10 and 20. Toes (taxawu-
sito) are added between 11 and 14; and “one foot” (kaetaxu) is 
used in 15. Twenty is “two hands together with two feet”:
11: aniha-kabe-behe kae-taxuwusito (two hands and one toe)
12: aniha-kabe-behe aniha-tuxuwusito-behe (two hands and two 
toes)
15: aniha-kabe-behe kae-taxu-behe (two hands and one foot)
2http://indian-cultures.com/Cultures/guahibo.html
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As pointed out, recognition of individual marks or elements 
up to three is easy: It represents an immediate perception read-
ily recognizable. Beyond three, the number of marks (strokes 
or dots) usually has to be counted and errors are more likely. 
Furthermore, it is rather time-consuming and cumbersome to 
be constantly counting marks. Interestingly, the different digit 
notational systems always represent one, two and three with 
strokes (or points, or any specific mark). In other words, the 
numbers one, two and three are written making one, two or 
three strokes. But beyond these figures, digit writing may give 
way to other strategies. In our Arabic digit notation system, 
“one” is a vertical line whereas two and three were originally 
horizontal lines that became tied together by being handwritten 
(Ifrah, 2000). This observation may be related with the inborn 
ability to perceptually recognize up to three elements. Beyond 
three, errors become progressively more likely. Perceptually dis-
tinguishing eight and nine strokes is not as easy as distinguishing 
between two and three strokes. The introduction of a different 
representation for quantities over three was a useful and practi-
cal simplification.
The numerical system, along with measurement units, were 
developed departing from the body dimensions (fingers, hands, 
arm, steps, etc.). This tendency to use the human body not only to 
count but also as measure units is still observed in some contem-
porary measurement units (e.g., foot).
Adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing were possible 
in the Egyptian system, but of course, following procedures quite 
different from those procedures we currently use. Egyptians based 
multiplication and division on the “duplication” and “halving” 
method (Childe, 1936). Interestingly, this very same procedure 
(duplicating and halving quantities) is also observed in illiter-
ate people when performing arithmetical operations. Thus, to 
multiply 12 × 18 in the Egyptian system the following procedure 
was followed:
 1 18
 2 36
 *4 72
 *8 144
 Total 216
(The number 18 is duplicated one or several times, and the 
amounts corresponding to 12 (4 + 8 in this example) are selected 
and summed up: 72 + 144 = 216. To divide, the inverse proce-
dure was used. Therefore, the procedure used to divide 19 by 8 
would be:
 1 8
 *2 16
 2 4
 *4 2
 *8 1
That is, 2 + 4 + 8 (2 + 1/4 + 1/8), which is 2.375
In brief, different steps were followed in the development of 
arithmetical abilities: representing quantities, initially as corre-
spondence constructions (i.e., one mark represents one element), 
later new marks were added to represent larger quantities (usually 
10); providing a positional value to the marks; using fractions; and 
computing quantities (adding and subtracting; and later multiply-
ing and dividing).
60 or any 60-multiple and another different symbol represented the 
number 10 and any 10-multiple. Thus, for example, the number 
173 was then represented: 2 × 60 (the symbol for 60 repeated 
twice) + 5 × 10 (the symbol for 10 repeated five times) + 3 (a sym-
bol for units repeated three times). A base of 60 has remained for 
some contemporary time measures (e.g., minutes and seconds). 
Twelve is also frequently maintained as a “second-order” unit (e.g., 
a dozen). Evidently, 60 results from “five times twelve”. Five obvi-
ously is “one hand”, and the question becomes, where does 12 come 
from? What are the two additional units? It might be speculated 
that 12 means the 10 fingers plus the two feet – or even the two 
elbows or the two shoulders or the two knees (individuality of 
components is easier to appreciate in the hands than in the feet). 
But this is only speculation, although it is feasible according to our 
knowledge about counting procedures used in different cultural 
groups (Levy-Bruhl, 1910/1947; Ifrah, 2000; Dansilio, 2008).
Maya Indians developed a similar system, but had 20 as a base 
(Leon-Portilla, 1986). They used different symbols to represent 20, 
400 (20 × 20), and 8000 (20 × 20 × 20) (Cauty, 1984).
Thus, reviewing the history of numerical concepts, it is found 
that world languages developed a base 10 (10 fingers) or 20 (10 
fingers plus 10 toes) or even five (five fingers) to group quantities. 
In some contemporary languages a residual 20-base can be found 
(e.g., in French 80 can be “four twenties”). In many contemporary 
languages, different words are used between 1 and 10. Between 10 
and 20, the numerical systems usually become irregular, unpre-
dictable, and idiosyncratic. From 20 onward, numbers are formed 
simply with the words “twenty plus one”, “twenty plus two”, etc. 
Some contemporary languages still use a five-base in counting. For 
instance, in the Amerindian language Tanimuca in South America3, 
speakers count up to five. Between five and 10, numbers are “five 
one”, “five two”, and so on.
Further developments oF arIthmetIcal abIlItIes
Writing numbers appeared earlier in history than writing language. 
Some cultures (e.g., Incas) developed a number representing sys-
tem, but not a language representing system (Swadesh, 1967). As 
mentioned before, “calculus” means pebble. Pebbles, marks, knots, 
or any other element were used as a correspondence construction to 
record the number of elements (people, cows, fishes, houses, etc). In 
Sumer, the first number writing system has been found (about 3,000 
BC) (Childe, 1936; Ifrah, 2000): Instead of using pebbles, fingers, 
or knots, it was simpler just to make a mark (a stroke or a point) 
on the floor, on a tree branch, or on a board if one wanted to keep 
the record. In Egypt, India and later in Crete, a similar system was 
developed: units were represented by a conventional symbol (usu-
ally a stroke) repeated several times to mean a digit between one 
and nine; a different symbol was used for 10 and 10-multiples.
Positional digit value is clearly evident in Babylonians, and 
around 1,000 BC the zero was introduced. Positional value and zero 
are also evident in Maya Indians (Leon-Portilla, 1986). Egyptians 
and Babylonians commonly used fractions. Small fractions (1/2, 
1/3, and 1/4) are relatively simple numerical concepts, and even 
chimpanzees can be trained to use small fractions (Woodruff and 
Premack, 1981).
3http://www.ethnologue.com/show_family.asp?subid=931-16
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 examined the ability to enumerate sets of stimuli, and another two 
experiments required judgments about two concurrently presented 
stimuli that were either identically coded (i.e., two Arabic numerals, 
two number words, or two arrays of dots) or differently coded (e.g., 
an Arabic numeral and a number word). Both hemispheres were 
equally able to enumerate stimuli and make comparisons between 
numerical representations regardless of stimuli coding. However, 
the left hemisphere was more accurate than the right when the task 
involved number words.
Cohen et al. (2000) reported a patient with a lesion in the left per-
isylvian area who showed a severe impairment in all tasks involving 
numbers in a verbal format, such as reading aloud, writing to dicta-
tion, or responding verbally to questions of numerical knowledge. 
In contrast, her ability to manipulate non-verbal representation of 
numbers, i.e., Arabic numerals, was comparatively well preserved. 
This observation supports the proposal that language and calcula-
tion disorders can be dissociated (Basso et al., 2000). Some authors 
have assumed that language and numerical concepts are differently 
organized in the brain and follow distinct developmental patterns 
in children (Gelman and Butterworth, 2005). Other authors have 
suggested that calculation and language are mediated by partially 
different and also partially overlapped brain systems (Baldo and 
Dronkers, 2007). Semenza et al. (2006) have emphasized that cal-
culation and language usually share the same hemisphere.
In summary, diverse brain areas are activated during the per-
formance of different arithmetical tasks, although contemporary 
evidence suggests that the intraparietal sulcus seems to the play the 
most crucial role. During the learning of new calculation abilities, 
additional brain areas become involved and the specific pattern of 
brain activity depends on the particular type of test that is used. 
It can be assumed that during human history, the development 
of new numerical abilities was correlated with the involvement 
of new brain areas during the performance of progressively more 
complex numerical tasks.
conclusIon
Arithmetical abilities and number representation have existed 
for only some 5000–6000 years. Most likely, during the Stone-
Age, only simple counting up to three and, of course, “bigger” 
and “smaller” (magnitude judgment) concepts were present. 
Global quantification is observed at the pre-human level. 
Correspondence constructions allowed increasing the amount 
of numbers to be used. The most immediate correspondence 
construction is performed with the fingers. Finger knowledge 
and counting represent, to a certain extent, the same cognitive 
ability, as is still evident in some contemporary languages, such 
as Sikuani.
Counting, finger gnosis, and even lateral spatial knowledge may 
present a common historical origin. Seemingly, calculation abilities 
were derived from finger sequencing. Number representation and 
arithmetical operations are observed only since some 5000–6000 
years ago. Currently, calculation abilities are rapidly evolving due 
to the introduction of modern technology and resulting cognitive 
demands. Right-left discrimination (as well as the use of other 
spatial concepts) most likely was present in pre-historic man, 
because requirements of spatial abilities may have been very high, 
even higher than in contemporary man (Hours, 1982; Ardila and 
the neuroscIence oF calculatIon abIlItIes
Since primary acalculia (a basic defect in computational ability) was 
initially described by Henschen (1925) it has been associated with 
left posterior parietal damage (e.g., Mazzoni et al., 1990; Ardila et al., 
2000; Mayer et al., 2003). Furthermore, it was suggested that differ-
ent cerebral pathways are responsible for processing rote numerical 
knowledge (e.g., multiplication tables) and semantic knowledge of 
numerical quantities. Dehaene and Cohen (1997) have proposed 
that a left subcortical network contributes to the storage and retrieval 
of rote verbal arithmetical facts, whereas an inferior parietal network 
is dedicated to the mental manipulation of numerical quantities.
Neuroimaging techniques (e.g., fMRI) have been used to analyze 
the pattern of brain activity during diverse calculation tasks. It 
has been demonstrated that different brain areas are active dur-
ing arithmetical tasks, but the specific pattern of brain activity 
depends on the particular type of task that is used. At minimum, 
the following brain areas become activated during calculation: the 
upper cortical surface and anterior aspect of the left middle frontal 
gyrus (Burbaud et al., 1995); the supramarginal and angular gyrus 
(bilaterally) (Rueckert et al., 1996); the left dorsolateral prefron-
tal and premotor cortices, Broca’s area, and the inferior parietal 
cortex (Burbaud et al., 1999); and the left parietal and inferior 
occipitotemporal regions (lingual and fusiform gyri) (Rickard 
et al., 2000). The diversity of brain areas involved in arithmetical 
processes supports the assumption that calculation ability repre-
sents a multifactor skill, including verbal, spatial, memory, body 
knowledge, and executive function abilities (Ardila and Rosselli, 
2002). Dehaene et al. (2004), however, proposed that regardless 
of the diversity of areas that become active during arithmetical 
tasks, the human ability for arithmetic is associated with activation 
of very specific brain areas, in particular, the intraparietal sulcus. 
Neuroimaging studies with humans have demonstrated that the 
intraparietal sulcus is systematically activated during a diversity of 
number tasks and could be regarded as the most crucial brain region 
in the understanding and use of quantities (Ashkenazi et al., 2008). 
These observations have been supported using brain electrostimu-
lation (Roux et al., 2009). Other brain areas, such as the precentral 
area and the inferior prefrontal cortex, are also activated when 
subjects engage in mental calculations. RoŞca (2009) has proposed 
that there exists a fronto–parieto–subcortical circuit responsible for 
complex arithmetic calculations and that procedural knowledge 
relies on a visuo-spatial sketchpad that contains a representation 
of each sub-step of the procedure.
Traditionally, calculation defects have been associated with pos-
terior left parietal damage (Henschen, 1925; Boller and Grafman, 
1983), and frequently included in the so-called Gerstmann’s (or 
angular gyrus) syndrome. Symptoms of Gerstmann’s syndrome 
(acalculia with agraphia, disorders in right-left orientation, and 
finger agnosia) (Gerstmann, 1940) can be found during direct cor-
tical stimulation in the angular gyrus region (Roux et al., 2003). 
Using fMRI, it has been observed that the left angular gyrus is not 
only involved in arithmetic tasks requiring simple fact retrieval, 
but may show significant activations as a result of relatively short 
training of complex calculation (Delazer et al., 2003).
Colvin et al. (2005) investigated numerical abilities in a split-
brain patient using experiments that examined the hemispheres’ 
abilities to make magnitude comparisons. One experiment 
Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2010 | Volume 2 | Article 7 | 6
Ardila Evolution of calculation abilities
reFerences
Antell, S. E., and Keating, D. (1983). 
Perception of numerical invariance by 
neonates. Child Dev. 54, 695–701.
Ardila, A. (1993). On the origins of cal-
culation abilities. Behav. Neurol. 6, 
89–98.
Ardila, A., Concha, M., and Rosselli, M. 
(2000). Angular gyrus syndrome revis-
ited: acalculia, finger agnosia, right-left 
disorientation, and semantic aphasia. 
Aphasiology 14, 743–754.
Ardila, A., Lopez, M. V., and Solano, E. 
(1989). “Semantic aphasia recon-
sidered,” in Brain Organization of 
Language and Cognitive Processes, eds 
A. Ardila and F. Ostrosky-Solis (New 
York: Plenum Publishing Company), 
77–193.
Ardila, A., and Ostrosky, F. (1984). 
“Some final remarks,” in The 
Right Hemisphere: Neurology and 
Neuropsychology, eds A. Ardila and 
F. Ostrosky-Solis (London: Gordon 
and Breach Science Publishers), 
265–273.
Ardila, A., and Rosselli, M. (2002). Acalculia 
and dyscalculia. Neuropsychol. Rev. 12, 
179–231.
Ashkenazi, S., Henik, A., Ifergane, G., 
and Shelef, I. (2008). Basic numerical 
processing in left intraparietal sulcus 
(IPS) acalculia. Cortex 44, 439–448.
Baldo, J. V., and Dronkers, N. F. (2007). 
Neural correlates of arithmetic and 
language comprehension: a com-
mon substrate? Neuropsychologia 45, 
229–235.
Basso, A., Burgio, F., and Caporali, A. (2000). 
Acalculia, aphasia and spatial disor-
ders in left and right brain- damaged 
patients. Cortex 36, 265–280.
Boller, F., and Grafman, J. (1983). 
Acalculia: Historical development 
and current significance. Brain Cogn. 
2, 205–223.
Burbaud, P., Camus, O., Guehl, D., Bioulac, 
B., Caille, J. M., and Allard, M. (1999). 
A functional magnetic resonance 
imaging study of mental subtraction 
in human subjects. Neurosci. Lett. 273, 
195–199.
Burbaud, P., Degreze, P., Lafon, P., Franconi, 
J. M., Bouligand, B., Bioulac, B., Caille, J. 
M., and Allard, M. (1995). Lateralization 
of prefrontal activation during inter-
nal mental calculation: a functional 
magnetic resonance imaging study. J. 
Neurophysiol. 74, 2194–2200.
Capaldi, E. J., and Miller, D. J. (1988). 
Counting in rats: its functional sig-
nificance and the independent cog-
nitive processes that constitute it. J. 
Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process 14, 
3–17.
Cauty, A. (1984). Taxonomie, syntaxe et 
economie des numerations parlees. 
Amerindia 9, 111–146.
Childe, V. G. (1936). Man Makes Himself. 
London: Pitman Publishing.
Cohen, L., Dehaene, S., Chochon, F., 
Lehericy, S., and Naccache, L. (2000). 
Language and calculation within 
the parietal lobe: a combined cog-
nitive, anatomical and fMRI study. 
Neuropsychologia 38, 1426–1440.
Colvin, M. K., Funnell, M. G., and 
Gazzaniga, M. S. (2005). Numerical 
processing in the two hemispheres: 
studies of a split-brain patient. Brain 
Cogn. 57, 43–52.
Cook, J. L., and Cook, G. (2009). Child 
development: Principles and perspec-
tives. Boston: Pearson Allyn and 
Bacon.
Dansilio, S. (2008). Los trastornos 
del cálculo y el procesamiento del 
número. Montevideo: Prensa Médica 
Latinoamericana.
Davis, H., and Perusse, R. (1988). 
Numerical competence in animals: 
Definitional issues, current evidence 
and a new research agenda. Behav. 
Brain Sci. 11, 561–615.
Dehaene, S. (1997). The Number Sense. 
How the Mind Creates Mathematics. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Dehaene., S., and Cohen, L. (1997). 
Cerebral pathways for calculation: 
double dissociation between rote 
verbal and quantitative knowledge of 
arithmetic. Cortex 33, 219–250.
Dehaene, S., and Dehaene-Lambertz, G. 
(2009). Neuro-imagerie cognitive: 
phylogenèse et ontogenèse. Bull. Acad. 
Natl. Med. 193, 883–889.
Dehaene, S., Molko, N., Cohen, L., and 
Wilson, A. J. (2004). Arithmetic and 
the brain. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 14, 
218–224.
Delazer, M., Domahs, F., Bartha, L., 
Brenneis, C., Lochy, A., Trieb, T., and 
Benke, T. (2003). Learning complex 
arithmetic-an fMRI study. Brain Res. 
Cogn. Brain Res. 18, 76–88.
Fuson, K. C. (1988). Children’s Counting 
and the Concepts of Number. New York: 
Springer-Verlag.
Gelman, R., and Butterworth, B. (2005). 
Number and language: how are they 
related? Trends Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 
9, 6–10.
Gerstmann, J. (1940). The syndrome of fin-
ger agnosia, disorientation for right and 
left, agraphia and acalculia. Arch. Neurol. 
Neurochir. Psychiatr. 44, 398–408.
Henschen, S. E. (1925). Clinical and 
anatomical contributions on brain 
pathology. Arch. Neurol. Psychiatry 13, 
226–249.
Hitch, G., Cundick, J., Haughey, M., Pugh, 
R., and Wright, H. (1987). “Aspects of 
counting in children’s arithmetics,” in 
Cognitive Processes in Mathematics eds 
J. A. Sloboda and D. Rogers (Oxford: 
Clearendon Press), 26–41.
Hours, F. (1982). Les Civilisations 
du Pal Néolithique. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de la France.
Hurford, R. (1987). Language and Number. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Ifrah, G. (2000). The Universal History of the 
Numbers. New York: Wiley. Available at: 
indian-cultures.com/Cultures/huitoto.
html. Retrieved December 17, 2009; 
indian- cultures.com/Cultures/guahibo.
html. Retrieved December 17, 2009.
Kansaku, K., Johnson, A., Grillon, M. L., 
Garraux, G., Sadato, N., and Hallett, 
M. (2006). Neural correlates of 
counting of sequential sensory and 
motor events in the human brain. 
Neuroimage 31, 649–660.
Kaufmann, L. (2008). Dyscalculia: 
Neuroscience and education. Educ. 
Res. 50, 163–175.
Klein, A., and Starkey, P. S. (1987). “The 
origins and development of numerical 
cognition: A comparative analysis,” in 
Cognitive Processes in Mathematics, eds 
J. A. Sloboda and D. Rogers (Oxford: 
Clearendon Press), 1–25.
Koehler, O. (1951). The ability of birds 
to count. Bull. Anim. Behav. 9, 41–45.
Leon-Portilla, M. (1986). Tiempo y 
Realidad en el Pensamiento Maya 
[Time and reality in Maya think-
ing]. México: Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México.
Levy-Bruhl, L. (1910/1947). Las Funciones 
Mentales en las Sociedades Inferiores 
[Mental functions in lower societies]. 
Buenos Aires: Lautaro.
Mayer, E., Reicherts, M., Deloche, G., 
Willadino-Braga, L., Taussik, I., 
Dordain, M., Van der Linden, M., 
and Annoni, J. M. (2003). Number 
processing after stroke: anatomo-
clinical correlations in oral and writ-
ten codes. J. Int. Neuropsychol. Soc. 9, 
899–912.
Mazzoni, M., Pardossi, L., Cantini, R., 
Giornetti, V., and Arena, R. (1990). 
Gerstmann’s syndrome: a case report. 
Cortex 25, 459–468.
Mechner, F. (1958). Probability relations 
within response sequences under ratio 
reinforcement. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 1, 
109–121.
Parker, S. T., and Gibson, K. H. (1979). A 
developmental model for the evolu-
tion of language and intelligence in 
early hominids. Behav. Brain Sci. 2, 
367–408.
Pontius, A. A. (1989). Color and spatial 
error in block design in stone-age 
Auca Indians: Ecological underuse of 
occipital-parietal system in men and 
of frontal lobes in women. Brain Cogn. 
10, 54–75.
Premack, D. (1976). Intelligence in Ape and 
Man. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Queixalos, F. (1989). Numeración tradi-
cional Sikuani. [Traditional Sikuani 
numbering] Glotta, 3, 28–31.
Rickard, T. C., Romero, S. G., Basso, G., 
Wharton, C., Flitman, S., and Grafman, 
J. (2000). The calculating brain: An 
 problems. Also, it has been suggested that there exists a fronto–
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